Violation of a condition in a juvenile pretrial release order is not punishable as contempt

In re Q.B., No. 14-FS-645 (decided June 11, 2015).

Players: Associate Judges Thompson and Beckwith, Senior Judge Steadman.  Opinion by Judge Beckwith.  PDS for Q.B.  Trial Judge: Danya Dayson. 

Facts: The District filed a delinquency petition charging Q.B. with unlawful entry, and the trial court determined pretrial detention was necessary.  On the defense’s motion, the court subsequently released Q.B. from detention subject to several conditions, one of which was a 7:00 p.m. curfew.  A week before trial, Q.B. was caught violating curfew.  The District therefore filed a second petition charging Q.B. with contempt under D.C. Code § 11-944(a)(2).  The original petition was dismissed for want of prosecution, but the District pressed on with the contempt prosecution.  Q.B. filed a motion to dismiss the second petition arguing that it failed to charge an offense.  The trial court agreed and dismissed the petition. 

Issues 1: Did the trial court have the authority to dismiss the petition for failing to state a charge before holding a hearing? 

Holding: Of course. Juvenile Court Rule 12 provides that “any defense objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion and in accordance with Rule 47-I.”  Specifically, this includes “‘defenses and objections based on defects in the petition,’ including failure to charge an offense.”

Issue 2: Did the petition validly charge an offense under the general contempt statute, D.C. Code § 11-944, by alleging that Q.B. violated a condition of his pretrial order? 

Holding:  No.  Relying on (Anthony) Jones, 51 A.3d 1290 (D.C. 2012), the court held that the violation of a pretrial release order is not punishable as contempt in juvenile court.  The court distinguishes its prior cases affirming contempt convictions in similar situations by finding they have no stare decisis effect given that the argument was never made in those cases that violation of a release order could not be prosecuted as contempt.

Of Note:

• The court did not decide the question whether a court can issue a freestanding order to a pretrial juvenile requiring that he or she abide by a condition independent of the pretrial release power (fn 6). 

• The court also did not decide Q.B.’s claim that § 11-944 does not define an “offense” that can be prosecuted as a delinquent act, but notes that it is an open question (fn 9).  DH

Read full opinion here.