Friday, June 12, 2015

Proof of prolonged detention is not necessary for a kidnapping conviction



Anthony Richardson and James Walker v. United States, Nos. 12-CF-1303 & 12-CF-1409 (decided June 11, 2015).

Players: Judges Fisher, Blackburne-Rigsby, and Pan (sitting by designation).  Opinion by Judge Pan.  Cory Carlyle for Mr. Richardson.  PDS for Mr. Walker.  Trial Judge: Michael Ryan.

Facts: Mr. Richardson and Mr. Walker were convicted of kidnapping while armed and a host of other charges relating to an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of November 20, 2011.  They challenged their kidnapping convictions, urging the court to adopt the majority approach to construing the elements of kidnapping, which would require the government to prove that the detention underlying the kidnapping was prolonged or for an appreciable length of time, and not incidental to another offense.  Mr. Richardson also challenged his conviction for carrying a dangerous weapon related to a knife found in Mr. Walker’s possession.

Issue 1: Does the kidnapping statute encompass an element of “non-incidental” confinement requiring the government to prove prolonged detention of the victim?

Holding: No.  Although recognizing that other jurisdictions impose such a requirement to “address the risk of severe sanctions being imposed for kidnapping based on a broad and ill defined range of behavior, including relatively trivial types of restraint,” the DCCA held that it was bound by its decision in Hagins v. United States, 639 A.2d 612 (D.C. 1994), in which the Court considered and rejected a similar argument. 

Issue 2: Was there sufficient evidence to find Mr. Richardson guilty of carrying a dangerous weapon when there was no evidence that he actually possessed the weapon?

Holding: Yes.  The Court found that the defendant could be properly convicted under a Pinkerton conspiracy liability theory.  It did not matter to the court that the jury acquitted appellants of the actual conspiracy charge, as the verdicts on an indictment do not have to be consistent.

Of Note:

  • The court recognized that a footnote in Parker v. United States, 692 A.2d 913, 917 n.5 (D.C. 1997) may cast doubt as to the validity of Hagins, but was “unwilling to conclude that the footnote in Parker overrules a case that it does not even mention.”  DH


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