A defendant’s fear that he had been discovered as a police informant by the decedent who called him a “snitch a** b****” was relevant to the defendant’s claim of self defense.

Troy Richardson v. United States, No. 11-CF-755 (decided August 28, 2014)

Troy Richardson v. United States, No. 11-CF-755

Players: Associate Judges Fisher and Blackburne-Rigsby, Senior Judge Belson.  Opinion by Senior Judge Belson.  Edward F.C. Gain, Jr., for appellant.  Trial Judge Gerald I. Fisher.

Facts:  Richardson was initially charged with first-degree murder while armed and carrying a dangerous weapon (CDW) in the stabbing death of Tyrone Wheaton.  After the first trial, the jury acquitted Richardson of first-degree and second-degree murder while armed, but hung on voluntary manslaughter while armed and CDW.  A second trial resulted in Richardson’s conviction on the manslaughter and CDW charges.  Government witnesses testified that after an argument, Richardson stated that he was going to kill Wheaton before stabbing Wheaton who was unarmed.  Wheaton’s two sons, testified as defense witnesses that Wheaton was swinging a crow bar at Richardson when Richardson stabbed him.  Richardson testified that the altercation began when Wheaton approached him and called him a “‘snitch-a** b****’” and then attacked him, hitting Richardson with something hard in his back before Richardson grabbed a knife and stabbed Wheaton.  At the first trial the jury heard evidence that Richardson had “‘snitched’” on Wheaton and his drug dealing operation to the police, a fact that was confirmed by the testimony of a police sergeant.  Richardson testified at the first trial that he was afraid of Wheaton because he believed Wheaton knew he had given information to the police and because “‘once you’re known in the neighborhood as being a snitch [it has] repercussions behind it.’”  Prior to the second trial, however, the government moved to exclude that evidence as irrelevant.  The trial court granted the government’s motion, excluding evidence that Richardson spoke to the police months before the stabbing about drug dealing at Wheaton’s apartment, that the police had executed a search warrant at Wheaton’s apartment, and testimony by Richardson that he believed Wheaton knew he had talked to the police.  The trial judge ordered Richardson not to discuss the matter in his testimony, explaining to him that “‘what you think people may have thought about you, just that view without more, is not relevant … unless you can prove that, in fact, they did have that thought.”         

Issue:  In a self-defense homicide case, was evidence that the defendant previously informed on the decedent’s drug dealing operation, and that the defendant feared that the decedent knew about the defendant’s previous informing activities, relevant to the defendant’s self-defense claim where the decedent allegedly called the defendant a “snitch a** b****” right before the altercation that ended in the decedent’s stabbing death?  

Holding:  The trial court abused its discretion in precluding the evidence as irrelevant.  The issue is not whether the decedent actually knew that Richardson was an informant and therefore actually wanted to harm him, the issue is whether Richardson was reasonably fearful of the decedent, for that reason and/or other reasons.  “We conclude that the trial court required Richardson to prove too much.  The trial court said that the ‘snitch’ evidence could not bridge the gap between what Richardson believed about what Wheaton thought and what Wheaton actually thought.  However, in order to raise self-defense in this case, Richardson did not have to show that his beliefs underlying his self-defense claim were true, only that they were reasonable and honestly held.”  Furthermore, the evidence would have supported Richardson’s testimony that Wheaton called him a “‘snitch-a** b****’” and the evidence would provide context that would make the “‘snitch-a** b****’” remark “seem more ominous and threatening.”  The exclusion prevented Richardson from presenting a complete defense and was not harmless.   

Of Note: 

·         There is some language in the harm analysis that, if taken out of context, could be confusing.  Specifically: “[D]efendants have a right to present crucial relevant evidence establishing a valid defense.  Not all relevant evidence meets this bar.”  (quotations and citations omitted).  This does not mean that when defendants proffer evidence it must be more than relevant – “crucial” – to be admissible.  Relevant evidence should never be excluded because it is not “crucial.”  The question of whether the evidence is “crucial relevant evidence establishing a valid defense” only relates to the appellate court’s determination of which harm standard to apply when a trial court has erroneously excluded relevant evidence.  The “crucial” language is in the Court’s harm analysis, which the Court engaged in only because it had already concluded that the exclusion of relevant evidence – even if it is not “crucial” – was erroneous.  The Court quoted the “crucial” language from harm discussions in other cases, which focused on determining whether the erroneous exclusion of particular evidence in those cases rose to the level of constitutional error, requiring application of the Chapman beyond a reasonable doubt standard, or whether the exclusion was non-constitutional and the Kotteakos harm standard should be applied. JA.

Read the full opinion here.